LIVETHREAT INTELLIGENCE
NVD/NISTCVE-2025-29927 — Next.js Middleware Auth Bypass · All versions <15.2.3 affectedCRITICAL 9.1AlienVault OTXAPT29 (Cozy Bear) — Active Spear-Phishing Campaign Targeting NATO DiplomatsCRITICAL 9.3Recorded FutureCl0p Ransomware — MOVEit-style Campaign Targeting MFT Solutions GloballyCRITICAL 9.5Shodan22,000+ Redis Instances Exposed on Port 6379 — No Auth — Cryptominer RiskHIGH 8.9VirusTotalCVE-2025-21298 — Windows OLE Remote Code Execution · CISA KEV Catalog AddedCRITICAL 9.8Censys14,500+ Exposed Kubernetes API Servers Detected — Anonymous Access EnabledHIGH 8.7AlienVault OTXFIN7 Carbanak Group — New JavaScript Backdoor Targeting Retail POS SystemsHIGH 8.4NVD/NISTCVE-2025-24813 — Apache Tomcat RCE via Partial PUT · Exploit Code PublicCRITICAL 9.8Recorded FutureDark Web Auction: 2.1M U.S. Healthcare Records Listed · PII + Insurance DataHIGH 8.1VirusTotalLumma Stealer v4.1 — New Evasion Bypass for Windows Defender SmartScreenHIGH 8.6NVD/NISTCVE-2025-30065 — Apache Parquet RCE via Schema Parsing · CVSS Maximum ScoreCRITICAL 10.0Recorded FutureSalt Typhoon (China) — Telco Backdoors Persist in 3 U.S. Carriers Post-DisclosureCRITICAL 9.2VirusTotalDragonForce Ransomware — New Affiliate Program Attracting LockBit DefectorsHIGH 8.5ShodanCitrix NetScaler Bleed (CVE-2023-4966) — 4,800 Unpatched Hosts Still ExploitableCRITICAL 9.4CensysIvanti Connect Secure 0-Day Chain — Nation-State Actor Exploitation ConfirmedCRITICAL 9.0AlienVault OTXBEC Surge Q1 2026 — $3.1B in Wire Fraud · AI Voice Cloning in UseHIGH 7.9NVD/NISTCVE-2025-29927 — Next.js Middleware Auth Bypass · All versions <15.2.3 affectedCRITICAL 9.1AlienVault OTXAPT29 (Cozy Bear) — Active Spear-Phishing Campaign Targeting NATO DiplomatsCRITICAL 9.3Recorded FutureCl0p Ransomware — MOVEit-style Campaign Targeting MFT Solutions GloballyCRITICAL 9.5Shodan22,000+ Redis Instances Exposed on Port 6379 — No Auth — Cryptominer RiskHIGH 8.9VirusTotalCVE-2025-21298 — Windows OLE Remote Code Execution · CISA KEV Catalog AddedCRITICAL 9.8Censys14,500+ Exposed Kubernetes API Servers Detected — Anonymous Access EnabledHIGH 8.7AlienVault OTXFIN7 Carbanak Group — New JavaScript Backdoor Targeting Retail POS SystemsHIGH 8.4NVD/NISTCVE-2025-24813 — Apache Tomcat RCE via Partial PUT · Exploit Code PublicCRITICAL 9.8Recorded FutureDark Web Auction: 2.1M U.S. Healthcare Records Listed · PII + Insurance DataHIGH 8.1VirusTotalLumma Stealer v4.1 — New Evasion Bypass for Windows Defender SmartScreenHIGH 8.6NVD/NISTCVE-2025-30065 — Apache Parquet RCE via Schema Parsing · CVSS Maximum ScoreCRITICAL 10.0Recorded FutureSalt Typhoon (China) — Telco Backdoors Persist in 3 U.S. Carriers Post-DisclosureCRITICAL 9.2VirusTotalDragonForce Ransomware — New Affiliate Program Attracting LockBit DefectorsHIGH 8.5ShodanCitrix NetScaler Bleed (CVE-2023-4966) — 4,800 Unpatched Hosts Still ExploitableCRITICAL 9.4CensysIvanti Connect Secure 0-Day Chain — Nation-State Actor Exploitation ConfirmedCRITICAL 9.0AlienVault OTXBEC Surge Q1 2026 — $3.1B in Wire Fraud · AI Voice Cloning in UseHIGH 7.9
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How We Cracked a Corporate Network in 4 Hours Using Only Kali Linux and OSINT

A full engagement narrative: starting with zero internal access, our team used open-source intelligence gathering, Kali Linux tooling, and a single misconfigured VPN endpoint to achieve domain admin within a four-hour window.

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HorizonShield Red Team
March 16, 2026

Phase 1: Reconnaissance (45 Minutes)

Before touching a single tool, we conducted passive OSINT. LinkedIn revealed the IT infrastructure team used Cisco ASA firewalls and Palo Alto for perimeter security. Job postings mentioned "VMware vSphere experience required." A GitHub repository belonging to a junior developer contained a hard-coded staging VPN URL in a Python script committed 14 months prior.

From Shodan, we confirmed the VPN endpoint was publicly accessible and running a firmware version from 2021 — two major releases behind, with three published CVEs.

Phase 2: Initial Access (35 Minutes)

CVE-2021-20016, a pre-authentication remote code execution vulnerability in SonicWall SSL-VPN, had a working public PoC. The endpoint matched the vulnerable version. We obtained an unauthenticated shell on the VPN gateway within 35 minutes of starting active exploitation.

From the gateway, we extracted the local credential cache — including a service account used for automated health checks. The account had domain read access and a password that had not been rotated in 3.5 years.

Phase 3: Lateral Movement (90 Minutes)

Using BloodHound to map Active Directory relationships, we identified a shortest path to Domain Admin: service account → IT support group → helpdesk workstation → local admin reuse → domain admin workstation → DA credentials in memory (Mimikatz).

The attack path required three hops. None triggered an alert.

Phase 4: Objective Achievement (30 Minutes)

Domain Admin was achieved 3 hours 20 minutes after engagement start. We demonstrated impact by accessing the financial reporting share, the HR system API, and the backup server — all without triggering SIEM alerts because all movement used legitimate credentials.

Lessons Applied

The client implemented: emergency VPN firmware patching, credential rotation policies (90-day maximum), Privileged Access Workstations for administrators, enhanced SIEM rules for off-hours lateral movement, and removed local admin rights from all workstations.

Penetration TestingCybersecurityHorizonShield
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HorizonShield Red Team
HorizonShield Security Team

Cybersecurity expert at HorizonShield, specializing in threat intelligence, incident response, and enterprise security architecture.